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Minutes IETF102: dnsop

Meeting Minutes Domain Name System Operations (dnsop) WG
Title Minutes IETF102: dnsop
State Active
Other versions plain text
Last updated 2018-07-26

## Chairs: Suzanne Woolf, Tim Wicinski, Benno Overeinder
## Minutes taken by Paul Hoffman and Benno Overeinder, Tomek Mrugalski
Text on slides is not reproduced here

## Updates of Old Work, Chairs, 10 min
5 documents completed WGLC: kskroll, terminology-bis attrlead, attrleaf-fix,
ip6rdns. Shepherd write-up ready for end of Friday for completed WGLC documents.

*Lack of feedback for capture-format, please send to the list.*

* draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations
Mike St. John: There is no list consensus
Wes Hardaker: Should the document move forward?
Please speak up on the list
Is it benefitial to the RFC Series?
Warren Kumari (as author): Happy to change the document name, if needed
Suzanne Woolf: It is the chairs' job to judge consensus
Wes: Silence is a fail
Mike: Agrees.
Has a problem with the content of the document
In current form, more harmful than useful

### Working group has to speak out support or no support on the mailing list

## Current Working Group Business

* draft-ietf-dnsop-algorithm-update, Ondrej Sury
Lots of people have read
Tim: Any pushback from the vendors for the curves?
Ondrej: No, they're in plenty of adoption in libraries
John Levine: Does this match what the implementers are doing?
Ondrej: Yes
Mark Andrews: Should do the same thing for SIG(0)
Ondrej: This should be a new document
Geoff Huston: Wants RECOMMENDED to be SHOULD
Ondrej: Thinks that it closer to natural language
Olaf Kolkman: Reads from RFC 2119
Paul Wouters: Should be more conservative for SIG(0)
Marco Davids: Suggests to change MUST to REQUIRED
Jim Fenton: Just for implementions, not for actions
Suzanne: Can you add implementation section
Warren: Add more text above and below the table about implementations
David Lawrence: Wants a hum on 2119 words

### Hum: Leave the wording alone
### Add implementation status/details and then Working Group Last Call

* DNS Cookies and their Operational Impacts, Ondrej Sury and Willem Toorop
Paul Woulters: mandatory algorithms, but some optional?
Ondrej: Need to work on this
Francis Dupont: There are some questions on which is faster? Ask cryptographers
Don Eastlake: Has been revving the draft, will join authors
?: What the response in the anycast goes to a different instance
Dan York: Have to go back to the audience who is writing
Don't give too many options
OK to have more than one, but not choices within
Olafur Gudmundsson: With TCP we don't need cookies. This is extra work
Kill cookies
Just use TCP
Ondrej: Has a real world problem with cookies
Paul Woulters: There are other drafts that mention cookies
Tariq Saraj: What about privacy?
Ondrej: It's in the draft
   Lorenzo Colitti: Instead of just using TCP, you can also use TFO
   Ted Lemon: In TCP, there is a suggestion to not use fragmentations
This also goes to don't use cookies
Ondrej: If we want to kill cookies, do this actively
Have the conversation first
Ray Bellis: There are operators who want to deploy cookies
Mark Andrews: You are "literally" saying kill DNS over UDP
Ted: Not personally arguing for this
Cookies have many features
I don't want to open a new socket for every request
Managing a lot of sockets is hard
Warren: Leaving things like this is dangerous
Jan ?: Doesn't implement cookies on server, and doesn't intend to add them
Generally down on cookies
Paul Wouters: If the only goal of cookies to help accidentally make open
resolvers not become part of botnets Please do not kill the cookies. Olafur:
Let's write a kill cookies draft Ben Schwartz: Would like to hear from stub
resolver developers about what their experience has been Willem Toorop: Already
in getdns library and with it in Stubby stub resolver David: Already a mess,
against TCP everywhere Skeptical that the BIND code could be made good enough
Questions about speed of DNS Dan: Understands what Olafur wants to do How
successful have we been on massive update to the DNS infrastructure? Takes ages.

### Working group must speak out on DNS cookies, its value, interop between
implementation and how to proceed, or write another draft Kill DNS Cookies. We
cannot do nothing, because as of now things break.

* Let's Talk CNAME at the Apex, Willem Toorop and Ondrej Sury and Tim Wicinski
(( Tim speaks from slides ))
Lars-Johan Liman: Can we have a clear problem description?
Tim: We need to be able to say something at the top of the zone
Ray: Amazon's solution only works if it is hosted on Amazon
Stéphane Bortzmeyer: Doesn't agree with the definition of problem
Want a match between the name and the server
Knows it won't be easy
Problem is not "CNAME at apex"
Likes SRV
Tony Finch: This also needs to support alias-plus-MX
Dan: Need to deal with the "not using www" problem
Needs to use proprietary solutions
Tim: Wants to be able to move between vendors easily
Liman: Please don't overload CNAME
Likes SRV solution
Mark: Had productive discussion yesterday
Should have a combined DNS/HTTP meeting, lock us in a room
Wes: Keeps falling on both sides of the fence
We are being asked to be solving a problem
(Lot's of yelling "no")
Joel Jaggli: Rejects notion that this is driven by another protocol
*Driven by meat bags in front of keyboards*
Wes: It was not the protocols' fault
Roy Arends: Locally host CNAME at parent
It still works, but is a horrible hack
We need to solve this
Wants a list of what breaks with CNAME at apex
Jared Mauch: There is lots of history of how this is handled in email
Many applications have such a hack
Assign some record types for these protocols
Tony Finch: We need a better fix than RFC 976(?)
Dan: How can we make something that people will use
Wants to meet business goals that push towards proprietary
Murray Kucherawy: Nervous about making changes to protocol that is really for a
change in users Liman: Willing to look at new record type Maybe do in software
tools to configure DNS (( Willem and Ondrej speak from slides )) John Levine:
This looks like BNAME Worth writing up, please do not progress it .cat uses
DNAME Nearly zero web servers were configured correctly for this This is a code
path that probably no one has tested Suzanne: How the world works vs. how the
world ought to work Ray: The meeting last night was going to set up a mailing

### Chairs will look into setting up a seperate mailing list for this discussion

Ben: Quad9 uses PowerDNS
Ondrej: Quad9 uses both PowerDNS and Unbound, and does see inconsistent answers
Suzanne: Encouragment for people who wanted to do work
Shane Kerr: Wants to know how to document how the work from last night should
be documented Suzanne: Out of scope (( Shane's notes from last night's meeting
can be found at ))

## Previously Discussed Work

* draft-huque-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec, Shumon Huque

How in the modern age do we get an operational document through DNSOP WG?
Tim: Asking for more feedback.
Sara Dickinson: Should go forward.
Dislikes companies needing to decided between multi-vendor and deploying DNSSEC
Does this model make it harder for someone using DNSSEC to migrate from one
vendor to another?

### Call for adoption is on the mailing list and ends by Friday

* draft-woodworth-bulk-rr, John Woodworth
Dozen people have read the document
David: a lot of relevant operators are not here
There is an interesting issue: if you have an RRtype that will change
authoritative behavior, we don't know how to signal to secondaries Mike: It
sort of intends to break DNSSEC in interesting ways Would be a more baked
statement on that Need such a statement before knowing if it would be ready for
adoption Shane: Doesn't think that not knowing the DNSSEC changes should
prevent adoption Paul Wouters: Confused about "informational", why isn't this
experimental? Suzanne: It probably needs to not be informational Warren: Needs
to explain what the experiment is John: Can people figure out how to implement
this without breaking DNSSEC What sort of expansions do people actually do?
Ray: This cannot just use Expert Review *Will* not go to expert review Peter
van Dijk: What does this solve? Allows ability to transfer zones that are eally
large from one server to another Jared: Generate large reverse zones for IPv6
takes long and makes large zone John: Thinks this is not a problem that should
not be solved John: Has seen large zone transfer fails Peter: Kill GENERATE
Tony: Doesn't need GENERATE Mark: ISPs weren't willing to delegate the reverse
zones to their customers Use UPDATE This is solvable without BULK Takes client
request John: A lot of times the customer is not technical enough to do this
Use SIG(0) for forward Lorenzo: Need a document saying how to do this Send it
to v6ops David: We are not cowards in this space There are other use cases
There are many problems that GENERATE creates Ted Lemon: There are a lot drafts
in HOMENET and DNSSD about updates Tobias Fiebig: About 15% of zones do dynamic
zone updates Dan: Thank you for bringing this here This is the reality of
operators John: There is number of vendors who are deploying something like this

### Chairs will discuss with AD (Warren) about status of the draft

## New Working Group Business

* draft-pwouters-powerbind, Paul Wouters
Shortened version of what was given at ICANN IDS meeting last Friday
Stuart Cheshire: Delegation only just one level down, not any depth?
Paul: Correct
George Michaelson: This helps with the hunting the zone cut problem
Paul: To some extent, but you have to follow up
This is better than web PKI
Peter: All parents above me cannot skip me should be done today
Roy: is not an ENT
Need clarification of how many levels down it
A parent could still be coerced to delegate just one level down, then the next
Paul: This is why we need DNSSEC Transparency
Helps limit the logging needed for DT
Seems a bit similar to label counter in DNSSEC
Matt Pounsett: How does interact with delegation data in real zones?
Paul: This would make orphaned glue rejected
This could be a deployment problem
Ben: Big supporter of DT
Why does the commitment need to be in the DNS?
Paul: That's only for top level
Wes: If you don't signal it in protocol, don't know what can't be logged
Equivalent to "we allow logging at this point of the tree"
This bounds the problem for the log
Ben: It is sufficient for the root to say it won't do this, and can tell the
TLDs what to do Paul: ICANN can't tell ccTLDs what to do Shumon: This sort of
assumes that most zones are delegation-only Would need to sign at each level
Wes: Wants more feedback about what should go into the document How complex
should the signaling be? Giovane Moura: Should go to see presentation in MAPRG

### Chairs Action:  Needs More Review
[[ Day 2 starts here ]]

* draft-song-atr-large-resp, Davey Song
Dozen people have read the draft
Geoff Huston: We are not confusing one
If you are on infrastructure that drops frags, this is great
If signed with DNSSEC, bigger respons
Ondřej: Implementer's report
Doesn't like the idea
Doesn't intend to implement unless there is a lot of interest
Shane: The extra packet is pretty small
In the worst case, it's 50% more packets and they are small
Likes the idea
Doesn't have to be implemented in the server, could be a daemon
Mark: Likes this
Whether bit or option is another matter
Not a big negative at all
JINMEI, Tatuya (神明達哉): Clever idea
Worth discussing
Makes UDP request stateful
Peter van Dijk: ATR changes a best case from 2 packets into 5 packets
APNIC research is useless
We are making amplification attacks worse
We have no intent to implement and is against adoption

### Chairs Action: Some interest but not enough for adoption at this time

draft-tariq-dnsop-iviptr, Tariq Saraj
Mark: Zero interest in implementing with this
Why not just start with names?
Doesn't think enough people will use these records
Ondřej: This is about IDR
Pushing provisioning problems into the DNS
Should not be implemented

### Chairs Action: No Interest

draft-wessels-dns-zone-digest, Wes Hardaker
George: Remove "Merkle trees"
On the list, asked for PGP; now likes this proposal
Ondřej: Likes the idea
Should be adopted
Maybe distribute by a torrent
Davey: Why not just use a checksum outside the zone
Wes: Same as PGP slide
Don't need to keep two file copies
Encourage more widespread of zone
Instead just add copyright on zone file itself
Wes: allows the checksum
Gain is that you get unmodified zone
Paul Wouters: Signature is over the wireformat?
Wes: Yes
Glue and child NS are not signed
Paul Wouters: Seems like rsync or whatever would be better
Warren: Could only update this when you want to write this to disk or transfer
Jim: Sign the rest of the zone first?
Wes: Yes
Mark: It is possible to do something similar: hash just the delegation points
Will work with dynamic updates
Also can loose RRSIGs

### Chairs Action: Interest in continuing, multiple implementations.

draft-kh-dnsop-7706bis, Paul Hoffman-Kumari
Geoff: Imagine I'm on a server on a host, I'm multi-homed, and forwards from IP
to the other. Am I breaking the rules? Paul:  Question for the doc. Geoff: What
if I have 3 IPs?  You're trying to constrain the moment.  You can't apply
constraint. Paul: We should discuss this in the document. Shane: Aggressive
NSEC now published, should reduce temptation... Paul: Why? Shane: All cache
misses will be handled Locally... Paul:  One reason of 7706 is to preserve
privacy. If you pull the root and pre-loading, nothing leaks. Shane: Will send
text on performance Andrew: If people do weird things, no protocol police...
Paul: Fairies but not police Wes: IETF document what people do on the internet.
We should adopt Ray: Don't care on restrictions, local mirror of root zone is
more important. Ondrej: Feel more Strongly than Ray and Andrew, don't
understand why its wrong. Peter (via Dan): All Major Resolvers decided not to
7706 directly, so update is necessary. adopt Lars: Can change the keys.

### Chairs Action: Interest in adoption

### Chairs Action: Sounds like Interest in Contuining