EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding
draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind-00

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (emu WG)
Last updated 2012-12-31 (latest revision 2012-06-29)
Replaces draft-hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-bind
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
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Expired & archived
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Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd None
IESG IESG state Expired
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind-00.txt

Abstract

As the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) evolves, EAP peers rely increasingly on information received from the EAP server. EAP extensions such as channel binding or network posture information are often carried in tunnel methods; peers are likely to rely on this information. [RFC 3748] is a facility that protects tunnel methods against man-in-the-middle attacks. However, cryptographic binding focuses on protecting the server rather than the peer. This memo explores attacks possible when the peer is not protected from man-in- the-middle attacks and recommends mutual cryptographic binding, a new form of cryptographic binding that protects both peer and server along with other mitigations.

Authors

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)