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EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding
draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind-00

The information below is for an old version of the document.
Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (emu WG)
Authors Sam Hartman , Margaret Cullen , Dacheng Zhang
Last updated 2012-12-31 (Latest revision 2012-06-29)
Replaces draft-hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-bind
Stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Formats
Expired & archived
plain text xml htmlized pdfized bibtex
Reviews
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind-00.txt

Abstract

As the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) evolves, EAP peers rely increasingly on information received from the EAP server. EAP extensions such as channel binding or network posture information are often carried in tunnel methods; peers are likely to rely on this information. [RFC 3748] is a facility that protects tunnel methods against man-in-the-middle attacks. However, cryptographic binding focuses on protecting the server rather than the peer. This memo explores attacks possible when the peer is not protected from man-in- the-middle attacks and recommends mutual cryptographic binding, a new form of cryptographic binding that protects both peer and server along with other mitigations.

Authors

Sam Hartman
Margaret Cullen
Dacheng Zhang

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)