EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 7029.
Expired & archived
|Authors||Sam Hartman , Margaret Cullen , Dacheng Zhang|
|Last updated||2012-12-31 (Latest revision 2012-06-29)|
|RFC stream||Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)|
|Additional resources||Mailing list discussion|
|Stream||WG state||WG Document|
|Send notices to||(None)|
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
As the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) evolves, EAP peers rely increasingly on information received from the EAP server. EAP extensions such as channel binding or network posture information are often carried in tunnel methods; peers are likely to rely on this information. [RFC 3748] is a facility that protects tunnel methods against man-in-the-middle attacks. However, cryptographic binding focuses on protecting the server rather than the peer. This memo explores attacks possible when the peer is not protected from man-in- the-middle attacks and recommends mutual cryptographic binding, a new form of cryptographic binding that protects both peer and server along with other mitigations.
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)