The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture
draft-ietf-mls-architecture-01
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2018-10-22
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draft-omara-mls-architecture
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IETF
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Katriel Cohn-Gordon <me@katriel.co.uk>, Cas Cremers <cas.cremers@cs.ox.ac.uk>, Thyla van der Merwe< thyla.van.der@merwe.tech>, Jon Millican <jmillican@fb.com>, Raphael Robert <raphael@wire.com>
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Network Working Group E. Omara
Internet-Draft Google
Intended status: Informational B. Beurdouche
Expires: April 25, 2019 INRIA
E. Rescorla
Mozilla
S. Inguva
Twitter
A. Kwon
MIT
A. Duric
Wire
October 22, 2018
The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture
draft-ietf-mls-architecture-01
Abstract
This document describes the architecture and requirements for the
Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol. MLS provides a security
layer for group messaging applications with from two to a large
number of clients. It is meant to protect against eavesdropping,
tampering, and message forgery.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Omara, et al. Expires April 25, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft MLS Architecture October 2018
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. General Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Group, Members and Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Authentication Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Delivery Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.1. Key Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.2. Key Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.3. Delivery of messages and attachments . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.4. Membership knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.5. Membership and offline members . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. System Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1. Asynchronous Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.2. Recovery After State Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.3. Support for Multiple Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.4. Extensibility / Pluggability . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.5. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.6. Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.7. Compatibility with future versions of MLS . . . . . . 10
3.2. Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. Connections between Clients and Servers (one-to-one) 10
3.2.2. Message Secrecy and Authentication . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Transport Security Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Delivery Service Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Authentication Service Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Client Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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