Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures
draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-01
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (anima WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Max Pritikin , Michael Richardson , Michael H. Behringer , Steinthor Bjarnason | ||
| Last updated | 2015-10-19 | ||
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draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-01
ANIMA WG M. Pritikin
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Informational M. Richardson
Expires: April 20, 2016 SSW
M. Behringer
S. Bjarnason
Cisco
October 18, 2015
Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures
draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-01
Abstract
This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an key
infrastructure using vendor installed IEEE 802.1AR manufacturing
installed certificates, in combination with a vendor based service on
the Internet. Before being authenticated, a new device has only
link-local connectivity, and does not require a routable address.
When a vendor provides an Internet based service, devices can be
forced to join only specific domains but in limited/disconnected
networks or legacy environments we describe a variety of options that
allow bootstrapping to proceed.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Architectural Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Functional Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Behavior of a new entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1.2. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.3. Request Join . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.4. Imprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1.5. Enrollment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.6. Being Managed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2. Behavior of a proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3. Behavior of the Registrar (Bootstrap Server) . . . . . . 15
3.3.1. Entity Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.2. Entity Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.3. Claiming the New Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3.4. Log Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3.5. Forwarding Audit Token plus Configuration . . . . . . 18
3.4. Behavior of the MASA Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.1. Issue Authorization Token and Log the event . . . . . 19
3.4.2. Retrieve Audit Entries from Log . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.5. Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps . . . 20
3.5.1. Network boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.6. Interactions with Network Access Control . . . . . . . . 20
4. Domain Operator Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1. Instantiating the Domain Certification Authority . . . . 21
4.2. Instantiating the Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3. Accepting New Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.4. Automatic Enrollment of Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.5. Secure Network Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1. Request Audit Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2. Request Audit Token from MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.3. Basic Configuration Information Package . . . . . . . . . 28
5.4. Request MASA authorization log . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6. Reduced security operational modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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6.1. New Entity security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2. Registrar security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.3. MASA security reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1. Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix A. Editor notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Introduction
To literally "pull yourself up by the bootstraps" is an impossible
action. Similarly the secure establishment of a key infrastructure
without external help is also an impossibility. Today it is accepted
that the initial connections between nodes are insecure, until key
distribution is complete, or that domain-specific keying material is
pre-provisioned on each new device in a costly and non-scalable
manner. This document describes a zero-touch approach to
bootstrapping an entity by securing the initial distribution of key
material using third-party generic keying material, such as a
manufacturer installed IEEE 802.1AR certificate [IDevID], and a
corresponding third-party service on the Internet.
The two sides of an association being bootstrapped authenticate each
other and then determine appropriate authorization. This process is
described as four distinct steps between the existing domain and the
new entity being added:
o New entity authentication: "Who is this? What is its identity?"
o New entity authorization: "Is it mine? Do I want it? What are
the chances it has been compromised?"
o Domain authentication: "What is this domain's claimed identity?"
o Domain authorization: "Should I join it?"
A precise answer to these questions can not be obtained without
leveraging an established key infrastructure(s). The domain's
decisions are based on the new entity's authenticated identity, as
established by verification of previously installed credentials such
as a manufacturer installed IEEE 802.1AR certificate, and verified
back-end information such as a configured list of purchased devices
or communication with a trusted third-party. The new entity's
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decisions are made according to verified communication with a trusted
third-party or in a strictly auditable fasion.
Optimal security is achieved with IEEE 802.1AR certificates on each
new entity, accompanied by a third-party Internet based service for
verification. Bootstrapping concepts run to completion with less
requirements, but are then less secure. A domain can choose to
accept lower levels of security when a trusted third-party is not
available so that bootstrapping proceeds even at the risk of reduced
security. Only the domain can make these decisions based on
administrative input and known behavior of the new entity.
The result of bootstrapping is that a domain specific key
infrastructure is deployed. Since IEEE 802.1AR PKI certificates are
used for identifying the new entity, and the public key of the domain
identity is leveraged during communiciations with an Internet based
service, which is itself authenticated using HTTPS, bootstrapping of
a domain specific Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is described.
Sufficient agility to support bootstrapping alternative key
infrastructures (such as symmetric key solutions) is considered
although no such alternate key infrastructure is described.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
The following terms are defined for clarity:
DomainID: The domain identity is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the BIT
STRING of the subjectPublicKey of the domain trust anchor that is
stored by the Domain CA. This is consistent with the RFC5280
Certification Authority subject key identifier of the Domain CA's
self signed root certificate. (A string value bound to the Domain
CA's self signed root certificate subject and issuer fields is
often colloquially used as a humanized identity value but during
protocol discussions the more exact term as defined here is used).
drop ship: The physical distribution of equipment containing the
"factory default" configuration to a final destination. In zero-
touch scenarios there is no staging or pre-configuration during
drop-ship.
imprint: the process where a device that wishes to join a network
acquires it's domain specific identity. This term is taken from
Konrad Lorenz's work in biology with new ducklings: during a
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critical period, the duckling would assume that anything that
looks like a mother duck is in fact their mother. [imprinting]
pledge: the prospective device, which has the identity provided to
at the factory. Neither the device nor the network knows if the
device yet knows if this device belongs with this network. This
is definition 6, according to [pledge]
Audit Token: A signed token from the manufacturer authorized signing
authority indicating that the bootstrapping event has been
successfully logged. This has been referred to as an
"authorization token" indicating that it authorizes bootstrapping
to proceed.
Ownership Voucher: A signed voucher from the vendor vouching that a
specific domain "owns" the new entity.
2. Architectural Overview
The logical elements of the bootstrapping framework are described in
this section. Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of the
components. Each component is logical and may be combined with other
components as necessary.
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.
.+------------------------+
+--------------Drop Ship-------------->.| Vendor Service |
| .+------------------------+
| .| M anufacturer| |
| .| A uthorized |Ownership|
| .| S igning |Tracker |
| .| A uthority | |
| .+--------------+---------+
| .............. ^
V |
+-------+ ............................................|...
| | . | .
| | . +------------+ +-----------+ | .
| | . | | | | | .
| <---L2---> | | <-------+ .
| | or | Proxy | | Registrar | .
| <---L3---> <---L3--> | .
| New | . | | | | .
| Entity| . +------------+ +-----+-----+ .
| | . | .
| | . +-----------------+----------+ .
| | . | Domain Certification | .
| | . | Authority | .
+-------+ . | Management and etc | .
. +----------------------------+ .
. .
................................................
"Domain" components
Figure 1
Domain: The set of entities that trust a common key infrastructure
trust anchor. This includes the Proxy, Registrar, Domain
Certificate Authority, Management components and any existing
entity that is already a member of the domain.
Domain CA: The domain Certification Authority (CA) provides
certification functionalities to the domain. At a minimum it
provides certification functionalities to the Registrar and stores
the trust anchor that defines the domain. Optionally, it
certifies all elements.
Registrar: A representative of the domain that is configured,
perhaps autonomically, to decide whether a new device is allowed
to join the domain. The administrator of the domain interfaces
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with a Registrar to control this process. Typically a Registrar
is "inside" its domain.
New Entity: A new device or virtual machine or software component
that is not yet part of the domain.
Proxy: A domain entity that helps the New Entity join the domain. A
Proxy facilitates communication for devices that find themselves
in an environment where they are not provided connectivity until
after they are validated as members of the domain. The New Entity
is unaware that they are communicating with a proxy rather than
directly with the Registrar.
MASA Service: A Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA)
service on the global Internet. The MASA provides a trusted
repository for audit log information concerning privacy protected
bootstrapping events.
Ownership Tracker An Ownership Tracker service on the global
internet. The Ownership Tracker uses business processes to
accurately track ownership of all devices shipped against domains
that have purchased them. Although optional this component allows
vendors to provide additional value in cases where their sales and
distribution channels allow for accurately tracking of such
ownership.
We assume a multi-vendor network. In such an environment there could
be a MASA or Ownership Tracker for each vendor that supports devices
following this document's specification, or an integrator could
provide a MASA service for all devices. It is unlikely that an
integrator could provide Ownership Tracking services for multiple
vendors.
This document describes a secure zero-touch approach to bootstrapping
a key infrastructure; if certain devices in a network do not support
this approach, they can still be bootstrapped manually. Although
manual deployment is not scalable and is not a focus of this document
the necessary mechanisms are called out in this document to ensure
such edge conditions are covered by the architectural and protocol
models.
3. Functional Overview
Entities behave in an autonomic fashion. They discover each other
and autonomically bootstrap into a key infrastructure deliminating
the autonomic domain. See
[I-D.irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions] for more information.
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This section details the state machine and operational flow for each
of the main three entities. The New Entity, the Domain (primarily
the Registrar) and the MASA service.
The overall flow is shown in Figure 2:
+---------+ +----------+ +-----------+
| New | Proxy | | | Vendor |
| Entity | not | Domain | | Service |
| | shown | | | (Internet)|
+---------+ +----------+ +-----------+
| | |
|<-------discovery--------->| |
|---IEEE 802.1AR identity-->| |
| | |
| [accept device?] |
| | |
| |---IEEE 802.1AR identity--->|
| |---Domain ID--------------->|
| | |
| | [optional: does
| | the device belong
| | to the domain?]
| | |
| | [update audit log]
| | |
| |<---device audit log--------|
| |<---audit token-------------|
| |<-- ownership voucher-------|
| | (optional) |
| | |
| [ still accept device?] |
| | |
|<----audit token-----------| |
|<----ownership voucher-----| (optional) |
|<----config information----| |
| | |
[audit token valid?] | |
[or ownership voucher valid?] | |
[apply config information] | |
| | |
|----domain enrollment----->| |
|<----domain certificate----| |
| | |
Figure 2
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3.1. Behavior of a new entity
A New Entity that has not yet been bootstrapped attempts to find a
local domain and join it.
States of a New Entity are as follows:
+--------------+
| Start |
| |
+------+-------+
|
+------v-------+
| Discover |
+------------> |
| +------+-------+
| |
| +------v-------+
| | Identity |
^------------+ |
| rejected +------+-------+
| |
| +------v-------+
| | Request |
| | Join |
| +------+-------+
| |
| +------v-------+
| | Imprint | Optional
^------------+ <--+Manual input
| Bad Vendor +------+-------+
| response |
| +------v-------+
| | Enroll |
^------------+ |
| Enroll +------+-------+
| Failure |
| +------v-------+
| | Being |
^------------+ Managed |
Factory +--------------+
reset
Figure 3
State descriptions are as follows:
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1. Discover a communication channel to the "closest" Registrar by
trying the following steps in this order:
A. Search for a Proxy on the local link using a link local
discovery protocol (no routable addresses are required for
this approach). If multiple local proxies are discovered
attempt communications with each before widening the search
to other options. The proxy relays information to the
registrar. If this fails:
B. Obtain an IP address using existing methods, such as SLAAC or
DHCPv6, and search for a local registrar using DNS service
discovery. [[EDNOTE: ]]If this fails:
C. Obtain an IP address (as above), and search for the domain
registrar using a pre-defined Factory provided Internet based
re-direct service. Various methods could be used, such as
DNS or RESTful APIs.
2. Identify itself. This is done by presenting an IEEE 802.1AR
credentials to the discovered Registrar (via a Proxy if
necessary). Included is a generated nonce that is specific to
this attempt.
3. Requests to Join the Discovered domain. The device indicates the
Imprint methods it will accept and provides a nonce ensuring that
any responses can be associated with this particular
bootstrapping attempt.
4. Imprint on the Registrar. This requires verification of the MASA
service generated Audit Token as provided by the contacted
Registrar or the validation of the vendor provided ownership
voucher. The Audit Token contains the DomainID information for
this device and is signed by the MASA service. The device uses a
pre-installed root certificate of the MASA service to validate
the signature of the Audit Token or the Ownership Voucher.
5. Enroll by accepting the domain specific information from the
Registrar, and by obtaining a domain certificate from the
Registrar using a standard enrollment protocol, e.g. Enrolment
over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030].
6. The New Entity is now a member of, and can be managed by, the
domain and will only repeat the discovery aspects of
bootstrapping if it is returned to factory default settings.
The following sections describe each of these steps in more detail.
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3.1.1. Discovery
Existing protocols provide the functionality for discovery of the
Domain Bootstrap Server. The result of discovery might be
communication with a proxy instead of a Domain Bootstrap Server. In
such a case the proxy facilitates communication with the actual
Domain Bootstrap Server in a manner that is transparent to the New
Entity.
To discover the Domain Bootstrap Server the New Entity performs the
following actions in this order:
1. MUST: Obtains a local address using either IPv4 or IPv6 methods
as described in [[EDNOTE: do we need a reference?]].
2. MUST: Attempt to establish a TLS connection to the next hop
neighbor at a well known AN port building on the [[EDNOTE: AN
node discovery discussion, need a reference??]]. [Toerless to
provide updated text]
3. MUST: unsecured-GRASP as a link local discovery method?
[Toerless to provide updated text]
4. MAY: Performs DNS-based Service Discovery [RFC6763] over
Multicast DNS [RFC6762] searching for the service
"_bootstrapks._tcp.local."
5. MAY: Performs DNS-based Service Discovery [RFC6763] over normal
DNS operations. In this case the domain is known so the service
searched for is "_bootstrapks._tcp.example.com".
6. MAY: If no local bootstrapks service is located using the DNS-
based Sevice Discovery methods the New Entity contacts a well
known vendor provided bootstrapping server by perfoming a DNS
lookup using a well known URI such as "bootstrapks.vendor-
example.com".
Once a domain bootstrapping server is discovered the New Entity
communicates with the discovered server using the bootstrapping
protocol defined in Section 5. The current DNS services returned
during each query is maintained until bootstrapping is completed. If
bootstrapping fails and the New Entity returns to the Discovery state
it picks up where it left off and continues attempting bootstrapping.
For example if the first Multicast DNS _bootstrapks._tcp.local
response doens't work then the second and third responses are tried.
If these fail the New Entity moves on to normal DNS-based Service
Discovery.
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Once all discovered services are attempted the device SHOULD return
to Multicast DNS and keep trying. The New Entity may prioritize
selection order as appropriate for the anticipated environment.
[[EDNOTE: An appropriate backoff or rate limiting strategy should be
defined here such that the device doesn't flood the local network
with queries. If the device were to eventually give up -- or at
least have too long between attempts -- a power cycle would restart
the backoff mechanism.]]
[[EDNOTE: it is unclear yet if discovery happens on a per interface
basis or once per device. What is the requirement around joining
multiple domains; is this a bootstrapping requirement or is this a
broader autonomic requirement]] [[EDNOTE: b. carpenter: I seem to
think we settled on joining one domain (which might be a sub-domain)
and then doing some sort of cross-certification to get authenticated
and authorized in another domain. If so, it isn't a bootstrap
requirement.]]
3.1.2. Identity
The New Entity identifies itself during the communication protocol
handshake. If the client identity is rejected the New Entity repeats
the Discovery process using the next proxy or discovery method
available.
The boostrapping protocol server is as of yet not validated. Thus
this connection is provisional and all data recieved is untrusted
until sufficiently validated even though it is over a (D)TLS
connection. This is aligned with the existing provisional mode of
EST [RFC7030] during s4.1.1 "Bootstrap Distribution of CA
Certificates".
All security associations established are between the new device and
the Bootstrapping server regardless of proxy operations.
3.1.3. Request Join
The New Entity POSTs a request to join the domain to the
Bootstrapping server. This request contains a New Entity generated
nonce and informs the Bootstrapping server which imprint methods the
New Entity will accept.
As indicated in EST [RFC7030] the bootstrapping server MAY redirect
the client to an alternate server. This is most useful in the case
where the New Entity has resorted to a well known vendor URI and is
communicating with the vendor's Registrar directly. In this case the
New Entity has authenticated the Registrar using the local Implicit
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Trust Anchor database and can therefore treat the redirect URI as a
trusted URI which can also be validated using the Implicit Trust
Anchor database. Since client authentication occurs during the TLS
handshake the bootstrapping server has sufficient information to
apply appropriate policy concerning which server to redirect to.
The nonce ensures the New Entity can verify that responses are
specific to this bootstrapping attempt. This minimizes the use of
global time and provides a substantial benefit for devices without a
valid clock.
3.1.4. Imprint
The domain trust anchor is received by the New Entity during the
boostrapping protocol methods in the form of either an Audit Token
containing the domainID or an explicit ownership voucher. The goal
of the imprint state is to securely obtain a copy of this trust
anchor without involving human interaction.
The enrollment protocol EST [RFC7030] details a set of non-autonomic
bootstrapping methods such as:
o using the Implicit Trust Anchor database (not an autonomic
solution because the URL must be securely distributed),
o engaging a human user to authorize the CA certificate using out-
of-band data (not an autonomic solution because the human user is
involved),
o using a configured Explicit TA database (not an autonomic solution
because the distribution of an explicit TA database is not
autonomic),
o and using a Certificate-Less TLS mutual authentication method (not
an autonomic solution because the distribution of symmetric key
material is not autonomic).
This document describes additional autonomic methods:
MASA audit token Audit tokens are obtained by the Registrar from the
MASA service and presented to the New Entity for validation.
These indicate to the New Entity that joining the domain has been
logged by a trusted logging server.
Ownership Voucher Ownership Vouchers are obtained by the Registrar
from the MASA service and explicitly indicate the fully qualified
domain name of the domain the new entity currently belongs to.
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Since client authentication occurs during the TLS handshake the
bootstrapping server has sufficient information to apply appropriate
policy concerning which method to use.
An arbitrary basic configuration information package that is signed
by the domain can be delivered alongside the Audit Token or ownership
validation. This information is signed by the domain private keys
and is a one time delivery containing information such as which
enrollment server to communicate with and which management system to
communicate with. It is intended as a limited basic configuration
for these purposes and is not intended to deliver entire final
configuration to the device.
If the autonomic methods fail the New Entity returns to discovery
state and attempts bootstrapping with the next available discovered
Registrar.
3.1.5. Enrollment
As the final step of bootstrapping a Registrar helps to issue a
domain specific credential to the New Entity. For simplicity in this
document, a Registrar primarily facilitates issuing a credential by
acting as an RFC5280 Registration Authority for the Domain
Certification Authority.
Enrollment proceeds as described in Enrollment over Secure Transport
(EST) [RFC7030]. The New Entity contacts the Registrar using EST as
indicated:
o The New Entity is authenticated using the IEEE 802.1AR
credentials.
o The EST section 4.1.3 CA Certificates Response is verified using
either the Audit Token which provided the domain identity -or-
o The EST server is authenticated by using the Owership Voucher
indicated fully qualified domain name to build the EST URI such
that EST section 4.1.1 bootstrapping using the New Entity implicit
Trust Anchor database can be used.
3.1.6. Being Managed
Functionality to provide generic "configuration" information is
supported. The parsing of this data and any subsequent use of the
data, for example communications with a Network Management System is
out of scope but is expected to occur after bootstrapping enrollment
is complete. This ensures that all communications with management
systems which can divulge local security information (e.g. network
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topology or raw key material) is secured using the local credentials
issued during enrollment.
See Section 3.5.
3.2. Behavior of a proxy
The role of the Proxy is to facilitate communications. The Proxy
forwards EST transport (TLS or DTLS) packets between the New Entity
and the Registrar that has been configured on the Proxy.
[[EDNOTE: To what extent do we need to explain how this occurs? It
is sufficient to indicate the basic behavior or do we need to
indicate here all the details? A rough implementation of an ipv4
proxy would be as follows:
socat -v tcp4-listen:443,reuseaddr,fork tcp4:registrar.example.com:443
There have been suggestions that a stateless proxy implementation
using a DTLS extension would be preferred. Is this a future
optimization opportunity or a short term requirement?]]
3.3. Behavior of the Registrar (Bootstrap Server)
Once a Registrar is established it listens for new entities and
determines if they can join the domain. The registrar delivers any
necessary authorization information to the new device and facilitates
enrollment with the domain PKI.
Registrar behavior is as follows:
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Contacted by New Entity
+
|
+-------v----------+
| Entity | fail?
| Authentication +---------+
+-------+----------+ |
| |
+-------v----------+ |
| Entity | fail? |
| Authorization +--------->
+-------+----------+ |
| |
+-------v----------+ |
| Claiming the | fail? |
| Entity +--------->
+-------+----------+ |
| |
+-------v----------+ |
| Log Verification | fail? |
| +--------->
+-------+----------+ |
| |
+-------v----------+ +----v-------+
| Forward | | |
| Audit | | Reject |
| token + config | | Device |
| to the Entity | | |
+------------------+ +------------+
Figure 4
3.3.1. Entity Authentication
The applicable authentication methods detailed in EST [RFC7030] are:
o the use of an IEEE 802.1AR IDevID credential,
o or the use of a secret that is transmitted out of band between the
New Entity and the Registrar (this use case is not autonomic).
3.3.2. Entity Authorization
In a fully automated network all devices must be securely identified
and authorized to join the domain.
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A Registrar accepts or declines a request to join the domain, based
on the authenticated identity presented. Automated acceptance
criteria include:
o allow any device of a specific type (as determined by the IEEE
802.1AR device identity),
o allow any device from a specific vendor (as determined by the IEEE
802.1AR identity),
o allow a specific device from a vendor (as determined by the IEEE
802.1AR identity)
Since all New Entities accept Audit Tokens the Registrar MUST use the
vendor provided MASA service to verify that the device's history log
does not include unexpected Registrars. If a device had previously
registered with another domain, the Registrar of that domain would
show in the log.
In order to validate the IEEE 802.1AR device identity the Registrar
maintains a database of vendor trust anchors (e.g. vendor root
certificates or keyIdentifiers for vendor root public keys). For
user interface purposes this database can be mapped to colloquial
vendor names. Registrars can be shipped with the trust anchors of a
significant number of third-party vendors within the target market.
If a device is accepted into the domain, it is expected request a
domain certificate through a certificate enrolment process. The
result is a common trust anchor and device certificates for all
autonomic devices in a domain (these certificates can subsequently be
used to determine the boundaries of the homenet, to authenticate
other domain nodes, and to autonomically enable services on the
homenet). The authorization performed during this phase MAY be
cached for the TLS session and applied to subsequent EST enrollment
requests so long as the session lasts.
3.3.3. Claiming the New Entity
Claiming an entity establishes an audit log at the MASA server and
provides the Registrar with proof, in the form of a MASA
authorization token, that the log entry has been inserted. As
indicated in Section 3.1.4 a New Entity will only proceed with
bootstrapping if a validated MASA authorization token has been
recieved. The New Entity therefore enforces that bootstrapping only
occurs if the claim has been logged.
Registrar's obtain the MASA URI via static configuration or by
extracting it from the IEEE 802.1AR credentail. [[EDNOTE: An
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appropriate extension for indicating the MASA URI could be defined in
this document]].
If ownership validation methods are being used the 'claiming' occured
during out-of-band integration within the sales process and is out-
of-scope. Instead the Registar simply requests an ownership
validation token.
During initial bootstrapping the New Entity provides a nonce specific
to the particular bootstrapping attempt. The Registrar SHOULD
include this nonce when claiming the New Entity from the MASA
service. Claims from an unauthenticated Registrar are only serviced
by the MASA resource if a nonce is provided.
The Registrar can claim a New Entity that is not online by forming
the request using the entities unique identifier and not including a
nonce in the claim request. Audit Tokens obtained in this way do not
have a lifetime and they provide a permanent method for the domain to
claim the device. Evidence of such a claim is provided in the audit
log entries available to any future Registrar. Such claims reduce
the ability for future domains to secure bootstrapping and therefore
the Registrar MUST be authenticated by the MASA service. [[EDNOTE:
some of this paragraph content belongs in the section on MASA
behavior]]
3.3.4. Log Verification
The Registrar requests the log information for the new entity from
the MASA service. The log is verified to confirm that the following
is true to the satisfaction of the Registrar's configured policy:
o Any nonceless entries in the log are associated with domainIDs
recognized by the registrar.
o Any nonce'd entries are older than when the domain is known to
have physical possession of the new entity or that the domainIDs
are recognized by the registrar.
If any of these criteria are unacceptable to the registrar the entity
is rejected. The registar MAY be configured to ignore the history of
the device but it is RECOMMENDED that this only be configured if
hardware assisted NEA [RFC5209] is supported.
3.3.5. Forwarding Audit Token plus Configuration
The Registrar forwards the received Audit Token to the New Entity.
To simplify the message flows an initial configuration package can be
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delivered at this time which is signed by a representative of the
domain.
[[EDNOTE: format TBD. The configuration package signature data must
contain the full certificate path sufficient for the new entity to
use the domainID information (as a trust anchor) to accept and
validate the configuration)]]
3.4. Behavior of the MASA Service
The MASA service is provided by the Factory provider on the global
Internet. The URI of this service is well known. The URI SHOULD
also be provided as an IEEE 802.1AR IDevID X.509 extension (a "MASA
Audit Token Distribution Point" extension).
The MASA service provides the following functionalities to
Registrars:
3.4.1. Issue Authorization Token and Log the event
A Registrar POSTs a claim message optionally containing the bootstrap
nonce to the MASA server.
If a nonce is provided the MASA service responds to all requests.
The MASA service verifies the Registrar is representative of the
domain and generates a privacy protected log entry before responding
with the Audit Token.
If a nonce is not provided then the MASA service MUST authenticate
the Registrar as a valid customer. This prevents denial of service
attacks. The specific level of authentication provided by the
customer is not defined here. An MASA Practice Statement (MPS)
similar to the Certification Authority CPS, as defined in RFC5280, is
provided by the Factory such that Registrar's can determine the level
of trust they have in the Factory.
3.4.2. Retrieve Audit Entries from Log
When determining if a New Entity should be accepted into a domain the
Registrar retrieves a copy of the audit log from the MASA service.
This contains a list of privacy protected domain identities that have
previously claimed the device. Included in the list is an indication
of the time the entry was made and if the nonce was included.
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3.5. Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps
As the devices have a common trust anchor, device identity can be
securely established, making it possible to automatically deploy
services across the domain in a secure manner.
Examples of services:
o Device management.
o Routing authentication.
o Service discovery.
3.5.1. Network boundaries
When a device has joined the domain, it can validate the domain
membership of other devices. This makes it possible to create trust
boundaries where domain members have higher level of trusted than
external devices. Using the autonomic User Interface, specific
devices can be grouped into to sub domains and specific trust levels
can be implemented between those.
3.6. Interactions with Network Access Control
The assumption is that Network Access Control (NAC) completes using
the New Entity 802.1AR credentials and results in the device having
sufficient connetivity to discovery and communicate with the proxy.
Any additional connectivity or quarantine behavior by the NAC
infrastructure is out-of-scope. After the devices has completed
bootstrapping the mechanism to trigger NAC to re-authenticate the
device and provide updated network privileges is also out-of-scope.
This achieves the goal of a bootstrap architecture that can integrate
with NAC but does not require NAC within the network where it wasn't
previously required. Future optimizations can be achieved by
integrating the bootstrapping protocol directly into an initial EAP
exchange.
4. Domain Operator Activities
This section describes how an operator interacts with a domain that
supports the bootstrapping as described in this document.
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4.1. Instantiating the Domain Certification Authority
This is a one time step by the domain administrator. This is an "off
the shelf" CA with the exception that it is designed to work as an
integrated part of the security solution. This precludes the use of
3rd party certification authority services that do not provide
support for delegation of certificate issuance decisions to a domain
managed Registration Authority.
4.2. Instantiating the Registrar
This is a one time step by the domain administrator. One or more
devices in the domain are configured take on a Registrar function.
A device can be configured to act as a Registrar or a device can
auto-select itself to take on this function, using a detection
mechanism to resolve potential conflicts and setup communication with
the Domain Certification Authority. Automated Registrar selection is
outside scope for this document.
4.3. Accepting New Entities
For each New Entity the Registrar is informed of the unique
identifier (e.g. serial number) along with the manufacturer's
identifying information (e.g. manufacturer root certificate). This
can happen in different ways:
1. Default acceptance: In the simplest case, the new device asserts
its unique identity to the registrar. The registrar accepts all
devices without authorization checks. This mode does not provide
security against intruders and is not recommended.
2. Per device acceptance: The new device asserts its unique identity
to the registrar. A non-technical human validates the identity,
for example by comparing the identity displayed by the registrar
(for example using a smartphone app) with the identity shown on
the packaging of the device. Acceptance may be triggered by a
click on a smartphone app "accept this device", or by other forms
of pairing. See also [I-D.behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap] for
how the approach could work in a homenet.
3. Whitelist acceptance: In larger networks, neither of the previous
approaches is acceptable. Default acceptance is not secure, and
a manual per device methods do not scale. Here, the registrar is
provided a priori with a list of identifiers of devices that
belong to the network. This list can be extracted from an
inventory database, or sales records. If a device is detected
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that is not on the list of known devices, it can still be
manually accepted using the per device acceptance methods.
4. Automated Whitelist: an automated process that builds the
necessary whitelists and inserts them into the larger network
domain infrastructure is plausible. Once set up, no human
intervention is required in this process. Defining the exact
mechanisms for this is out of scope although the registrar
authorization checks is identified as the logical integration
point of any future work in this area.
None of these approaches require the network to have permanent
Internet connectivity. Even when the Internet based MASA service is
used, it is possible to pre-fetch the required information from the
MASA a priori, for example at time of purchase such that devices can
enrol later. This supports use cases where the domain network may be
entirely isolated during device deployment.
Additional policy can be stored for future authorization decisions.
For example an expected deployment time window or that a certain
Proxy must be used.
4.4. Automatic Enrollment of Devices
The approach outlined in this document provides a secure zero-touch
method to enrol new devices without any pre-staged configuration.
New devices communicate with already enrolled devices of the domain,
which proxy between the new device and a Registrar. As a result of
this completely automatic operation, all devices obtain a domain
based certificate.
4.5. Secure Network Operations
The certificate installed in the previous step can be used for all
subsequent operations. For example, to determine the boundaries of
the domain: If a neighbor has a certificate from the same trust
anchor it can be assumed "inside" the same organization; if not, as
outside. See also Section 3.5.1. The certificate can also be used
to securely establish a connection between devices and central
control functions. Also autonomic transactions can use the domain
certificates to authenticate and/or encrypt direct interactions
between devices. The usage of the domain certificates is outside
scope for this document.
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5. Protocol Details
For simplicity the bootstrapping protocol is described as extensions
to EST [RFC7030].
EST provides a bootstrapping mechanism for new entities that are
configured with the URI of the EST server such that the Implicit TA
database can be used to authenticate the EST server. Alternatively
EST clients can "engage a human user to authorize the CA certificate
using out-of-band data such as a CA certificate". EST does not
provide a completely automated method of bootstrapping the PKI as
both of these methods require some user input (either of the URI or
authorizing the CA certificate).
This section details additional EST functionality that support
automated bootstrapping of the public key infrastructure. These
additions provide for fully automated bootstrapping. These additions
are to be optionally supported by the EST server within the same
.well-known URI tree as the existing EST URIs.
The "New Entity" is the EST client and the "Registrar" is the EST
server.
The extensions for the client are as follows:
o The New Entity provisionally accept the EST server certificate
during the TLS handshake as detailed in EST section 4.1.1
("Bootstrap Distribution of CA Certificates").
o The Registrar requests and validates the Audit Token from the
vendor authorized MASA service.
o The New Entity requests and validates the Audit Token as described
below. At this point the New Entity has sufficient information to
validate domain credentials.
o The New Entity calls the EST defined /cacerts method to obtain the
current CA certificate. These are validated using the Audit
Token.
o The New Entity completes bootstrapping as detailed in EST section
4.1.1.
These extensions could be implemented as an independent protocol from
EST but since the overlap with basic enrollment is extensive,
particularly with respect to client authorization, they are presented
here as additions to EST.
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In order to obtain a validated Audit Token and Audit Log the
Registrar contacts the MASA service Service using REST calls:
+-----------+ +----------+ +-----------+ +----------+
| New | | | | | | |
| Entity | | Proxy | | Registrar | | Vendor |
| | | | | | | |
++----------+ +--+-------+ +-----+-----+ +--------+-+
| | | |
| | | |
| (D)TLS hello | | |
Establish +---------------> (D)TLS hello | |
(D)TLS | |---------------> |
connection | (forwarding) | |
| Server Cert <---------------+ |
<---------------+ | |
| Client Cert | | |
+-------------------------------> |
| | | |
HTTP REST | POST /requestaudittoken | |
Data +--------------------nonce------> |
| . | /requestaudittoken
| . +---------------->
| <----------------+
| | /requestauditlog
| +---------------->
| audit token or owner voucher <----------------+
<-------------------------------+ |
| (optional config information) | |
| . | |
| . | |
Figure 5
In some use cases the Registrar may need to contact the Vendor in
advanced, for example when the target network is airgapped. The
nonceless request format is provided for this and the resulting flow
is slightly different. The security differences associated with not
knowning the nonce are discussed below:
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+-----------+ +----------+ +-----------+ +----------+
| New | | | | | | |
| Entity | | Proxy | | Registrar | | Vendor |
| | | | | | | |
++----------+ +--+-------+ +-----+-----+ +--------+-+
| | | |
| | | |
| | | /requestaudittoken
| | (nonce +---------------->
| | unknown) <----------------+
| | | /requestauditlog
| | +---------------->
| | <----------------+
| (D)TLS hello | | |
Establish +---------------> (D)TLS hello | |
(D)TLS | |---------------> |
connection | (forwarding) | |
| SerVer Cert <---------------+ |
<---------------+ | |
| Client Cert | | |
+-------------------------------> |
| | | |
HTTP REST | POST /requestaudittoken | |
Data +----------------------nonce----> (discard |
| audit token or owner Voucher | nonce) |
<-------------------------------+ |
| (optional config information) | |
| . | |
| . | |
Figure 6
5.1. Request Audit Token
When the New Entity reaches the EST section 4.1.1 "Bootstrap
Distribution of CA Certificates" state but wishes to proceed in a
fully automated fashion it makes a request for a MASA authorization
token from the Registrar.
This is done with an HTTPS POST using the operation path value of
"/requestaudittoken".
The request format is JSON object containing a nonce.
Request media type: application/auditnonce
Request format: a JSON file with the following:
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{"nonce":"<64bit nonce value>", "OwnershipValidation":boolean}
[[EDNOTE: exact format TBD. There is an advantage to having the
client sign the nonce (similar to a PKI Certification Signing
Request) since this allows the MASA service to confirm the actual
device identity. It is not clear that there is a security benefit
from this since its the New Entity that verifies the nonce.]]
The Registrar validates the client identity as described in EST
[RFC7030] section 3.3.2. The registrar performs authorization as
detailed in Section 3.3.2. If authorization is successful the
Registrar obtains an Audit Token from the MASA service (see
Section 5.2).
The recieved MASA authorization token is returned to the New Entity.
As indicated in EST [RFC7030] the bootstrapping server can redirect
the client to an alternate server. If the New Entity authenticated
the Registrar using the well known URI method then the New Entity
MUST follow the redirect automatically and authenticate the new
Registrar against the redirect URI provided. If the New Entity had
not yet authenticated the Registrar because it was discovered and was
not a known-to-be-valid URI then the new Registrar must be
authenticated using one of the two autonomic methods described in
this document.
5.2. Request Audit Token from MASA
The Registrar requests the Audit Token from the MASA service using a
REST interface. For simplicity this is defined as an optional EST
message between the Registar and an EST server running on the MASA
service although the Registrar is not required to make use of any
other EST functionality when communicating with the MASA service.
(The MASA service MUST properly reject any EST functionality requests
it does not wish to service; a requirement that holds for any REST
interface).
This is done with an HTTP POST using the operation path value of
"/requestaudittoken".
The request format is a JSON object optionally containing the nonce
value (as obtained from the bootstrap request) and the IEEE 802.1AR
identity of the device as a serial number (the full certificate is
not needed and no proof-of-possession information for the device
identity is included). The New Entity's serial number is extracted
from the subject name :
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{"nonce":"<64bit nonce value>", "serialnumber", "<subjectname/
subjectaltname serial number>"}
Inclusion of the nonce is optional because the Registar might request
an authorization token when the New Entity is not online, or when the
target bootstrapping environment is not on the same network as the
MASA server.
The JSON message information is encapsulated in a PKCS7 signed data
structure that is signed by the Registrar. The entire certificate
chain, up to and including the Domain CA, MUST be included in the
PKCS7.
The MASA service checks the internal consistency of the PKCS7 but is
unable to actually authenticate the domain identity information. The
domain is not know to the MASA server in advance and a shared trust
anchor is not implied. The MASA server verifies that the PKCS7 is
signed by a Registrar (by checking for the cmc-idRA field in the
Registrar certificate) certificate that was issued by a the root
certificate included in the PKCS7. This is sufficient for the MASA
service to ensure that the Registar is in fact an authorized Registar
of the unknown domain.
The domain ID (e.g. hash of the public key of the domain) is
extracted from the root certificate and is used to generate the MASA
authorization token and to update the audit log.
[[EDNOTE: The authorization token response format needs to be defined
here. It consists of the nonce, if supplied, the serialnumber and
the trust anchor of the domain. For example:
{"nonce":"<64bit nonce value>", "serialnumber", "<subjectname/
subjectaltname serial number>","domainID":}
]]
[[EDNOTE: This assumes the Registrar can extract the serial number
successfullly from the cilent certificate. The RFC4108
hardwareModuleName is the best known location.]]
[[EDNOTE: There is a strong similarity between this and the previous
section. Both involve requesting the Audit Token from the upstream
element. Because there are differing requirements on the data
submitted and the signing of that data they are specified in distinct
sections. The design team should have a meeting to discuss how to
unify these sections or make the distinctions more clear]]
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5.3. Basic Configuration Information Package
When the MASA authorization token is returned to the New Entity an
arbitrary information package can be signed and delivered along side
it. This is signed by the Domain Registar. The New Entity first
verifies the Audit Token and, if it is valid, then uses the domain's
TA to validate the Information Package.
[[EDNOTE: The package format to be specified here. Any signed format
is viable and ideally one can simply be specified from netconf. The
Registar knows the New Entity device type from the 802.1AR credential
and so is able to determine the proper format for the configuration]]
5.4. Request MASA authorization log
A registrar requests the MASA authorization log from the MASA service
using this EST extension.
This is done with an HTTP GET using the operation path value of
"/requestMASAlog".
The log data returned is a file consisting of all previous log
entries. For example:
"log":[
{"date":"<date/time of the entry>"},
"domainID":"<domainID as extracted from the root
certificate within the PKCS7 of the
audit token request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or NULL)>"},
{"date":"<date/time of the entry>"},
"domainID":"<domainID as extracted from the root
certificate within the PKCS7 of the
audit token request>",
"nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or NULL)>"},
]
Distribution of a large log is less than ideal. This structure can
be optimized as follows: only the most recent nonce'd log entry is
required in the response. All nonce-less entries for the same
domainID can be condensed into the single most recent nonceless
entry.
The Registrar uses this log information to make an informed decision
regarding the continued bootstrapping of the New Entity.
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[[EDNOTE: certificate transparency might offer an alternative log
entry method]]
6. Reduced security operational modes
A common requirement of bootstrapping is to support less secure
operational modes for support specific use cases. The following
sections detail specific ways that the New Entity, Registrar and MASA
can be configured to run in a less secure mode for the indicated
reasons.
6.1. New Entity security reductions
Although New Entity can choose to run in less secure modes this is
MUST NOT be the default state because it permanently degrades the
security for all other uses cases.
The device may have an operational mode where it skips Audit Token
validation one time. For example if a physical button is depressed
during the bootstrapping operation. This can be useful if the MASA
service is unavailable. This behavior SHOULD be available via local
configuration or physical presence methods to ensure new entities can
always be deployed even when autonomic methods fail.
It is RECOMMENDED that this only be available if hardware assisted
NEA [RFC5209] is supported.
6.2. Registrar security reductions
The Registrar can choose to accept devices using less secure methods.
These methods are RECOMMENDED when low security models are needed as
the security decisions are being made by the local administrator:
1. The registrar MAY choose to accept all devices, or all devices of
a particular type, at the administrator's discretion. This could
occur when informing the Registrar of unique identifiers of new
entities might be operationally difficult.
2. The registrar MAY choose to accept devices that claim a unique
identity without the benefit of authenticating that claimed
identity. This could occur when the New Entity does not include
an IEEE 802.1AR factory installed credential.
3. The registrar MAY request nonce-less Audit Tokens from the MASA
service. These tokens can then be transmitted to the Registrar
and stored until they are needed during bootstrapping operations.
This is for use cases where target network is protected by an air
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gap and therefore can not contact the MASA service during New
Entity deployment.
4. The registrar MAY ignore unrecognized nonce-less Audit Log
entries. This could occur when used equipment is purchased with
a valid history being deployed in air gap networks that required
permanent Audit Tokens.
6.3. MASA security reductions
Lower security modes chosen by the MASA service effect all device
deployments unless paired with strict device ownership validation, in
which case these modes can be provided as additional features for
specific customers. The MASA service can choose to run in less
secure modes by:
1. Not enforcing that a Nonce is in the Audit Token. This results
in distribution of Audit Tokens that never expire and effectly
makes the Domain an always trusted entity to the New Entity
during any subsequent bootstrapping attempts. That this occured
is captured in the log information so that the Domain registrar
can make appropriate security decisions when a new device joins
the domain. This is useful to support use cases where Registrars
might not be online during actual device deployment. Because
this results in long lived Audit Tokens and do not require the
proof that the device is online this is only accepted when the
Registrar is authenticated by the MASA server and authorized to
provide this functionality. The MASA server is RECOMMENDED to
use this functionality only in concert with Ownership Validation
tracking.
2. Not verifying ownership before responding with an Audit Token.
This is expected to be a common operational model because doing
so relieves the vendor providing MASA services from having to
tracking ownership during shipping and supply chain and allows
for a very low overhead MASA service. The Registrar uses the
audit log information as a defense in depth strategy to ensure
that this does not occur unexpectedly (for example when
purchasing new equipment the Registrar would throw an error if
any audit log information is reported).
7. Security Considerations
In order to support a wide variety of use cases, devices can be
claimed by a registrar without proving possession of the device in
question. This would result in a nonceless, and thus always valid,
claim. Or would result in an invalid nonce being associated with a
claim. The MASA service is required to authenticate such Registrars
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but no programmatic method is provided to ensure good behavior by the
MASA service. Nonceless entries into the audit log therefore
permanently reduce the value of a device because future Registrars,
during future bootstrap attempts, would now have to be configured
with policy to ignore previously (and potentially unknown) domains.
Future registrars are recommended to take the audit history of a
device into account when deciding to join such devices into their
network. If the MASA server were to have allowed a significantly
large number of claims this might become onerous to the MASA server
which must maintain all the extra log entries. Ensuring the registar
is representative of a valid customer domain even without validating
ownership helps to mitigate this.
It is possible for an attacker to send an authorization request to
the MASA service directly after the real Registrar obtains an
authorization log. If the attacker could also force the
bootstrapping protocol to reset there is a theoretical opportunity
for the attacker to use the Audit Token to take control of the New
Entity but then proceed to enroll with the target domain. Possible
prevention mechanisms include:
o Per device rate limits on the MASA service ensure such timing
attacks are difficult.
o In the advent of an unexpectadly lost bootstrapping connection the
Registrar repeats the request for audit log information.
As indicated in EST [RFC7030] the connection is provisional and
untrusted until the server is successfully authorized. If the server
provides a redirect response the client MUST follow the redirect but
the connection remains provisional. If the client uses a well known
URI for contacting a well known Registrar the EST Implicit Trust
Anchor database is used as is described in RFC6125 to authenticate
the well known URI. In this case the connection is not provisional
and RFC6125 methods can be used for each subsequent redirection.
The MASA service could lock a claim and refuse to issue a new token
or the MASA service could go offline (for example if a vendor went
out of business). This functionality provides benefits such as theft
resistance, but it also implies an operational risk to the Domain
that Vendor behavior could limit future bootstrapping of the device
by the Domain. This can be mitigated by Registrars that request
nonce-less authorization tokens.
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7.1. Trust Model
[[EDNOTE: (need to describe that we need to trust the device h/w. To
be completed.)]]
8. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the various reviewers for their input, in
particular Markus Stenberg, Brian Carpenter, Fuyu Eleven.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[IDevID] IEEE Standard, , "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, DOI
10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap]
Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., and S. Bjarnason,
"Bootstrapping Trust on a Homenet", draft-behringer-
homenet-trust-bootstrap-02 (work in progress), February
2014.
[I-D.irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions]
Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,
Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic
Networking - Definitions and Design Goals", draft-irtf-
nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions-07 (work in progress),
March 2015.
[imprinting]
Wikipedia, , "Wikipedia article: Imprinting", July 2015,
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imprinting_(psychology)>.
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[pledge] Dictionary.com, , "Dictionary.com Unabridged", July 2015,
<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pledge>.
Appendix A. Editor notes
[[EDNOTE: This section is to capturing rough notes between editors
and Anima Bootstrapping design team members. This entire section to
be removed en masse before finalization]]
Change Discussion:
03 updated figures added "ownership voucher" concepts added "request
join" state to the new entity discussions broke discovery and
identity into two sections added request join section expanded
imprint autonomic methods as per design team discussions
simplified proxy discussion as per design team discussions
clarified 'entity authorization' clarified 'claiming the new
entity' removed EAP-EST references expanded on protocol details as
per ownership validation options slight additions to security
considerations
02 Moved sections for readability, Updated introduction, simplified
functional overview to avoid distractions from optional elements,
addressed updated security considerations, fleshed out state
machines.
The following is a non-prioritized list of work items currently
identified:
o Continue to address gaps/opportunities highlighted by community
work on bootstrappping. Refs: IETF92 "Survey of Security
Bootstrapping", Aana Danping He, behcet Sarikaya. "NETCONF Zero
Touch Update for ANIMA" https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/
anima.html and "Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures", Pritikin,
Behringer, Bjarnason
o IN PROGRESS: Intergrate "Ownership Voucher" as a valid optional
format for the MASA response. So long as the issuance of this is
logged and captured in the log response then the basic flow and
threat model is substantially the same.
o COMPLETE (moved to simple proxy): Attempt to re-use existing work
as per the charter: Toerless notes: a) are existing [eap] options?
or too complex? or doens't work? b) our own method (e.g. EAP-
ANIMA c) if b then investigate using signaling protocol).
o
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Authors' Addresses
Max Pritikin
Cisco
Email: pritikin@cisco.com
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
470 Dawson Avenue
Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7
CA
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ca/
Michael H. Behringer
Cisco
Email: mbehring@cisco.com
Steinthor Bjarnason
Cisco
Email: sbjarnas@cisco.com
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