Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-04

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (anima WG)
Last updated 2017-01-17 (latest revision 2016-10-31)
Replaces draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra
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ANIMA WG                                                     M. Pritikin
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Informational                             M. Richardson
Expires: May 4, 2017                                                 SSW
                                                            M. Behringer
                                                            S. Bjarnason
                                                                   Cisco
                                                               K. Watsen
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                        October 31, 2016

        Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
               draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-04

Abstract

   This document specifies automated bootstrapping of a remote secure
   key infrastructure (BRSKI) using vendor installed X.509 certificate,
   in combination with a vendor authorized service on the Internet.
   Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable address and a
   cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity, or on limited/
   disconnected networks.  Support for lower security models, including
   devices with minimal identity, is described for legacy reasons but
   not encouraged.  Bootstrapping is complete when the cryptographic
   identity of the new key infrastructure is successfully deployed to
   the device but the established secure connection can be used to
   deploy a locally issued certificate to the device as well.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.

Pritikin, et al.           Expires May 4, 2017                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                   BRewSKI                    October 2016

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.2.  Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.3.  Trust bootstrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   2.  Architectural Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.  Functional Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  Behavior of a Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.1.1.  Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       3.1.2.  Identity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       3.1.3.  Request Join  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.1.4.  Imprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.1.5.  Lack of realtime clock  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.1.6.  Enrollment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       3.1.7.  Being Managed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     3.2.  Behavior of a Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.2.1.  CoAP connection to Registrar  . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       3.2.2.  HTTPS proxy connection to Registrar . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.3.  Behavior of the Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       3.3.1.  Pledge Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.3.2.  Pledge Authorization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.3.3.  Claiming the New Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       3.3.4.  Log Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     3.4.  Behavior of the MASA Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       3.4.1.  Issue Audit Voucher and Log the event . . . . . . . .  24
       3.4.2.  Retrieve Audit Entries from Log . . . . . . . . . . .  24
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